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QUANTILE REGRESSION AND THE GENDER WAGE GAP: 
IS THERE A GLASS CEILING IN THE TURKISH LABOR MARKET? 
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 Aberconway Building, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU, UK  
March, 2017 
ABSTRACT 
Recent studies from different countries suggest that the gender gap is not constant across the 
wage distribution and the average wage gap provides limited information on women’s relative 
position in the labour market. Using micro level data from official statistics, this study explores 
the gender wage‐gap in Turkey across the wage distribution. The quantile regression and 
counterfactual decomposition analysis results reveal three striking features of the Turkish 
labour market. The first is that the gender wage gap is more pronounced at the upper tail of the 
wage distribution, implying the existence of a glass ceiling effect for women in the Turkish 
labour market. The second is that, the glass ceiling effect in Turkey is not observed in the raw 
gender wage gap and only revealed after controlling for workers’ labour market qualifications 
implying that women are better qualified and better educated than their male counterparts’ at 
the upper tail of the wage distribution. The third finding is that despite the narrowing effect of 
the women’s relative labour market qualifications, the glass ceiling effect in the Turkish labour 
market exists due to unequal treatment of men and women and the increasing labour market 
discrimination toward women as we move up the wage distribution. 
Key words: Gender wage gap, quantile regression, decomposition.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the gender wage gap at different points of the wage 
distribution in Turkey. The gender wage gap is one of the most salient issues that have been 
investigated in the empirical labor literature. For Turkey, there is a limited number of empirical 
studies on the topic (Ilkkaracan and Selim, 2007, Kara, 2006, Tansel, 2005, Dayioglu and 
Tunali, 2004, Dayioglu and Kasnakoglu, 1997), but most of these studies examine the average 
log wage gap between males and females. However, recent studies have shown that the gender 
gap is not constant across the wage distribution and therefore the average gap provides limited 
information about women’s integration into the labor market. The issue is particularly relevant 
for Turkey, given the on-going process of accession to the European Union (EU) and the efforts 
to increase the low ―and, surprisingly, declining― female labor force participation. 
Recent empirical work for different European and other developed countries has indeed 
suggested that the gender wage gap becomes more severe at the upper tail of the wage 
distribution than at the median or at lower tail. For instance Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman 
(2003) show that, the gender wage gap in Sweden increases throughout the wage distribution 
with acceleration in the upper tail. They interpret this result as the glass ceiling effect in Sweden. 
Albrecht, Vuuren and Vroman (2004) consider the gender wage gap for full-time workers in 
the Netherlands. As the fraction of women working full-time in the Netherlands is quite low, 
they consider the sample selection problem in their analysis. After sample selection adjustment, 
they find that a glass ceiling effect is present in the Netherlands. De la Rica, Dolado and Llorens 
(2008) perform a similar analysis for Spain, showing that for the college/tertiary education 
group, the gender wage gap is higher at the upper tail than at the lower tail of the wage 
distribution. On the other hand, they find that for the lower education group, the gap is much 
higher at the bottom than at the top of the distribution, which they interpret as statistical 
discrimination by employers, due to low participation rates of women in the lower education 
group.  
Using the European Union Household Panel, Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2007) address 
the same question for 10 European countries. They show that, on average, women are paid less 
than men in these countries. Their analyses show the existence of a glass ceiling in over half of 
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the countries considered. For the rest of the countries, they reveal that the gender wage gap is 
higher at the lower tail than at the upper tail of the wage distribution, which they interpret as a 
sticky floor effect. 
Jellal, Nordman and Wolff (2008) investigate the glass ceiling effect in France using a matched 
worker-firm data and question whether controlling for the firms’ characteristics matter for this 
effect. Although they do not propose any economic hypothesis related to firm characteristics, 
the relevance of including firm characteristics in wage equations and glass ceiling literature can 
be considered as a matter for empirical assessment. Introducing firm-related characteristics into 
the wage equations reduces the gender wage gap at the upper tail of the wage distribution, but 
the gap still remains much higher at the upper tail than at the lower. In other words, they confirm 
that, despite the decrease of the gender wage gap at the top of the distribution, the glass ceiling 
effect in the French labor market remains.  
Turkey is an important case in point for this study. Despite the economic and social 
developments that the country attained in the recent decade, female labor force participation 
rates are not only quite low relative to the international standards, but have also been decreasing 
for the past 20 years (World Bank, 2009). As one of the four pillars of EU Employment Strategy 
is gender equality, increasing the women who are actively employed has been set as a goal in 
the Ninth Development Plan of the Turkish Government. On the other hand, improving the 
labor market conditions for women who are already in the labor market is equally important as 
increasing the female labor force participation rates.  
In Turkey, women always receive lower wages than men (TUSIAD, 2001). The empirical 
studies point out that, despite the gender wage gap in the Turkish labor market widening or 
narrowing depending on education levels, sectors, occupations and the condition of 
employment, the gap is persistent. This not only has a direct impact on women’s participation 
decision in the labor force; it also affects their status within the labor market. Apparently, if the 
gender wage gap widens at the top levels of the wage distribution, women’s ability to upward 
advancement and access to male dominated occupations and sectors of the economy would be 
limited. The consequence is a labor market where “women remain concentrated in the lower 
levels of the job hierarchy: in the employment market, the company and the job category” (ILO, 
2004).  
There is no other study, as far as we know, that investigates the glass ceiling effect for the 
Turkish labor market. We therefore contribute to this strand of literature by examining the 
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existence of a significant glass ceiling effect in Turkey. Addressing this question requires 
examining the gender gap at the various points of the wage distribution. For this purpose, 
Section II gives a brief overview of the Turkish labor market and Section III explains the 
Structure of Earnings Survey 2006 and provides descriptive statistics on the dataset. Sections 
IV and V review the quantile regression models and the decomposition technique. Section VI 
summarizes the findings of quantile regressions and their decomposition. Finally, Section VII 
concludes. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH LABOR MARKET1  
The low labor force participation rates in Turkey present a challenge on her road toward EU 
accession. As of 2008, Turkey had one of the lowest labor force participation rates among the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries ― 48 percent. 
Turkey is still below 6 percentage points as compared to an average of 54 percent in a group of 
selected comparison Mediterranean countries that includes EU member and non-member 
countries. This is due to the very low labor force participation rate of women, in Turkey as seen 
from Figure 1.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Labor force participation rates: International context 
                                                          
1 See World Bank, 2006 and  2009; TUIK, 2006 for a more detailed overview of the Turkish labor market. 
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The female labor force participation rate in Turkey was 25 percent as of 2008, whereas this rate 
was 70 percent for males. The female participation rate in Turkey was 39 and 37 percentage 
points lower than the EU and OECD average, respectively. Even when compared with the 
average female labor force participation rate of selected Mediterranean countries included in 
Figure 1; Turkey was still 15 percent below this 40 percent average. Figure 2 illustrates more 
clearly this distinctly lower female labor force participation rate in an international context. 
Among the countries that had a similar GDP per capita as of 2008; Turkey had one of the lowest 
participation rates for women, together with Syria, Libya, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. In the 
EU member Mediterranean countries, the average female labor force participation rate was 47 
with the lowest Malta, 38 percent. Turkey was, still, 22 percentage points below this average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Female labor force participation rates: International context 
The Turkish Government, on her road toward EU accession, implemented a series of national 
policies aimed at increasing female labor force participation. The 9th Development Plan has set 
goals to increase the number of women who are actively employed. Within this framework, the 
New Labor Act enacted in 2003 examined women’s position in the Turkish labor market and a 
National Action Plan followed. The National Action Plan for Gender Equality (2008) 
emphasizes that “using women’s talents and skills in the labor market not only provides families 
with more economic independence, but also increases women’s self confidence and social 
respectability”. However, despite all these legislation changes that are likely to have a positive 
effect on female labor force participation, what is puzzling is depicted in Figure 3 ― the female 
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labor force participation rate in Turkey has been decreasing, from 37 percent in 1988 to 25 
percent in 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Female labor force participation rates: 1988-2008 
This result is surprising, considering that most of the OECD countries and EU member 
countries experienced a steady increase in female participation during this period. In 2009, the 
World Bank published, with the collaboration of the Turkish State Panning Organization, a 
report that considers “the puzzle of low female labor force participation” in Turkey. The report 
reveals the two main determinants of this decline: urbanization and the decline in agricultural 
employment. Urbanization resulted in women migrating from rural areas where they held the 
status of unpaid family workers in agriculture, to urban areas where they became unpaid 
household workers. However during these years, Turkey has experienced important structural 
and social changes that would be expected to facilitate women integration in the labor market: 
the social attitude toward working women has changed in recent years, women are becoming 
more educated, women are getting married at a later age, and fertility rates are declining (World 
Bank, 2009). 
The share of illiterate women declined from 33.9 percent to 19.6 percent, and the proportion of 
university graduate women increased from 1.8 percent to 5.8 over the past 20 years. In addition, 
the fertility rates in Turkey have been declining since the 1960’s. Women were expected to give 
birth on average to 5.7 children in 1960; 3 in 1988; and 1.9 in 2008 (World Bank, 2009).  
Despite these changes that most likely have a positive impact on the female labor force 
participation rate, its steady decline in the past 20 years is certainly an empirical question. For 
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this reason, the status of women in the Turkish labor market and the barriers to women who are 
already in the labor force, constitute a central issue and the major motivation of this study. 
III.  DATA: STRUCTURE OF EARNINGS SURVEY 2006 
This study is based on the data given by the Structure of Earnings Survey 2006, Turkish 
Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). At present, the Structure of Earnings Survey 2006 is a 
unique dataset for Turkey, as it provides information on the level, structure and development 
of wage and earnings. The survey is conducted on a total of 18 232 establishments associated 
with enterprises with ten or more employees, which were selected by simple random stratified 
sampling method in overall Turkey. The number of employee records is 308 214 and 77 percent 
of the employees covered in the survey were males while 23 percent were females. The 
reference month and year of the survey is November 2006. General information relating to 
employees is referred to November 2006 and questions on annual payments to employees are 
referred to the year 2006. 
The survey covers employees’ demographic characteristics (age, gender, and education level) 
and employment variables (occupation, labor status, managerial responsibility, seniority, wages 
and salaries, working hours) in the survey month and during the year 2006. The variables related 
to establishments such as size, coverage of collective agreement, as well as the information 
pertaining to employees throughout the year covering the C-K and M-O sections of the 
European Union Economic Activity Classification (NACE Rev.1.1) are included in the dataset.  
The analyses focus on full time employees, comprising 99.3 percent of all employees in the 
dataset (because the sample size of part time employees is not adequate to achieve reliable 
statistical inference, we have chosen to consider the more homogeneous group of full-timers). 
Only workers with type of employment indefinite and fixed term are considered (that is 99 
percent of the full time employees), leaving out the paid stagers and apprentices. Furthermore, 
the sample is restricted to individuals of working age, between 15 and 64 years old.  
Table 1 presents the distribution of employees; contractual working hours per week, monthly 
paid hours, hourly average gross wage, monthly average basic gross wage and monthly average 
gross wage by sex and educational attainment. The monthly basic gross wage includes the 
agreed upon and calculated gross wages paid to employees in November 2006 for days worked 
and not worked, excluding bonuses, premiums, social contributions, and overtime payments, 
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 Table 1.  Average working hours and monthly average gross wage by sex and educational 
attainment  
                                                                                                          
Educational attainment (ISCED, 
1997) 
         The 
distribution 
of 
employees   
Contractual  
working 
hours per 
week 
Monthly 
paid 
hours   
Hourly 
average 
gross 
wage 
Monthly 
average 
basic 
gross 
wage 
Monthly 
average 
gross 
wage 
(%)   (hours)   (TRY) 
Total 
 
100,0 
 
44,8 197,9 
 
5,2    936   1 023 
 
Primary school and below  30,8 
 
45,1 199,1 
 
3,8    687    750 
 
Primary education and 
secondary school 15,5 
 
45,1 199,1 
 
3,8    686    741 
 
High school 23,4 
 
44,9 198,0 
 
4,4    799    864 
 
Vocational high school 10,7 
 
44,8 200,8 
 
5,7    965   1 145 
 
Higher education 19,6 
 
44,1 193,1 
 
9,4   1 673   1 797 
          Males 
 
100,0 
 
44,9 198,5 
 
5,2    931   1 026 
 
Primary school and below  34,2 
 
45,1 199,2 
 
3,9 700 768 
 
Primary education and 
secondary school 16,7 
 
45,1 199,2 
 
3,8 701 762 
 
High school 22,0 
 
44,9 198,6 
 
4,4 805 877 
 
Vocational high school 11,0 
 
44,8 201,8 
 
6,0 995 1203 
 
Higher education 16,1 
 
44,2 194,0 
 
10,1 1786 1931 
          Females 
 
100,0 
 
44,6 195,6 
 
5,3    955   1 011 
 
Primary school and below  18,8 
 
45,2 198,9 
 
3,2    601    630 
 
Primary education and 
secondary school 11,3 
 
45,1 198,5 
 
3,2    602    630 
 
High school 28,3 
 
44,8 196,5 
 
4,3    781    828 
 
Vocational high school 9,3 
 
44,8 196,6 
 
4,6    833    896 
 
Higher education 32,3 
 
43,9 191,5 
 
8,3   1 470   1 557 
                 
           
whereas the monthly gross wage includes the sum of monthly basic wages, overtime payments, 
payments for shift work/night work and other regular payments paid to employees in November 
2006. Monthly paid hours include the sum of contractual working hours pertaining to basic 
wage and overtime hours worked in November 2006. The hourly wage is calculated by a simple 
division of monthly wage by monthly paid hours in November 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Table 1 female employees covered in the survey are more educated than their 
male counterparts. The male employees are concentrated in primary school education and 
below (34 percent), while women are concentrated in higher education (32 percent). The 
average weekly contractual working hours in Turkey was 44.8. There is not too much variation 
between education attainment levels and gender in terms of contractual working hours. On the 
other hand, when the monthly paid hours are compared across gender, there is more variation 
than in contractual working hours, which in turn implies that males worked more overtime 
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hours in November 2006 relative to their female counterparts in each educational attainment 
group.  
As Table 1 presents, the monthly average gross wage was 1,023 TRY in November 2006, 1,026 
and 1,011 TRY for males and females respectively. In other words, women earn 98.5 percent 
of the wages that men earn on average. It can be seen that the monthly basic wage constitutes 
more than 90 percent of the monthly gross wage for both genders. When basic wages are 
compared, we observe that women earn on average 2.5 percentage points more than males. 
However, in each educational attainment group, the monthly average basic gross wage of 
females is lower than males’. The higher average female monthly basic wage is the consequence 
of a composition effect, as women employees are concentrated in the higher education group. 
As it is clear from the table, there is a direct relation between educational attainment and wages, 
with wages increasing with education. The hourly average gross wage shows a similar pattern. 
The distribution of employees by economic activity, firm size, occupational group, type of 
employment and managerial responsibility is displayed in Table 2. Manufacturing shows the 
highest concentration of workers for both genders. The wholesalers and retail traders come next. 
Transport, storage and communication; real estate, renting and business activities; hotels and 
restaurants are sectors where both genders are almost equally concentrated. 7.5 percent of the 
female employees work in financial intermediation, a relatively high share when compared with 
the share of the male employees in this sector, 2.7 percent. Similarly, the mass of male 
employees is quite low in education, health and social work relative to their female counterparts. 
On the other hand, mining and quarrying; electricity, gas and water supply; construction seem 
to be almost exclusively male sectors. In terms of number of employees per firm, the mass of 
female and male employees are equally concentrated in each firm size group. Most of the 
employees that are covered in the survey are working in small size firms with 10-49 employees 
(46.7 percent). 
The occupation groups that are covered in the survey are based on the International Standards 
of Occupation (ISCO, 88). The skilled agricultural and fishery workers constitute only 0.3 
percent of the employees in the sample. For this reason, they are considered under the 
elementary occupations in Table 2 and in the rest of this study. It can be noted that craft and 
related trade workers; plant and machine operators and assemblers are occupations where males 
are highly concentrated. On the other hand, 21.8 percent of the female employees are working 
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Table 2. The distribution of employees by gender (%) 
          
Variable Total Males Females 
Economic activity (NACE Rev. 1.1) 100,0 100,0 100,0 
(C) Mining and quarrying 2,5 3,0 0,7 
(D) Manufacturing   42,9 44,5 37,4 
(E) Electricity, gas and water supply 3,2 3,7 1,0 
(F) Construction 5,2 5,9 2,5 
(G) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, personal and household goods 
17,5 16,8 19,7 
(H) Hotels and restaurants 4,6 4,6 4,4 
(I) Transport, storage and communication 7,6 8,0 6,0 
(J) Financial intermediation 3,7 2,7 7,5 
(K) Real estate, renting and business activities 6,0 5,7 7,2 
(M) Education 2,8 1,9 6,2 
(N) Health and social work 2,1 1,1 5,6 
(O) Other community, social and personal 
service activities 
2,0 2,0 1,9 
Firm Size 100,0 100,0 100,0 
  10-49 46,7 47,0 45,8 
  50-249 23,5 23,3 24,2 
  250-499 10,3 10,3 10,4 
  500-999 8,1 8,0 8,4 
  1000+ 11,3 11,3 11,2 
Occupational group (ISCO, 88) 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1 Legislators, senior officials and managers 5,2 5,3 5,0 
2 Professionals 7,1 5,4 13,0 
3 Technicians and associate professionals 15,6 14,1 20,7 
4 Clerks 10,9 7,9 21,8 
5 Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers 
10,6 11,0 9,4 
6 Craft and related trade workers 20,7 23,2 11,5 
7 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 14,3 16,6 6,0 
8 Elementary occupations 15,7 16,5 12,7 
Type of employment 100,0 100,0 100,0 
  Indefinite 95,9 95,6 97,2 
  Fixed term 4,1 4,4 2,8 
Managerial Responsibility 100,0 100,0 100,0 
  With managerial responsibility 14,7 14,9 14,2 
  Without managerial responsibility 85,3 85,1 85,8 
      
as clerks and 20.7 of them as technicians and associate professionals. Legislators, senior 
officials and managers are occupations where both genders are equally concentrated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For informative purposes, Table 2 includes the distribution of employees with respect to the 
variable managerial responsibility. 14.7 percent of the employees that are covered in the survey 
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Table 3. Sample means by gender 
  
Total Female Male 
Number of observations 302714   65 516   237 198 
Hourly wage 5,22 5,27 5,21 
 
(5,80) (5,94) (5,77) 
P90/P10 3,72 3,72 3,72 
P90/P50 3,31 3,34 3,31 
P50/P10 1,13 1,11 1,13 
Contractual working hrs per week 44,80 44,58 44,86 
 
(2,98) (3,15) (2,92) 
Age 32,93 30,53 33,60 
 
(8,57) (8,27) (8,53) 
Seniority 3,71 3,03 3,89 
  (5,21) (4,30) (5,42) 
Note: Standard deviations are in paranthesis 
 
had the managerial responsibility as of year 2006. Among men, this share was 14.9, while 14.2 
percent of the women employees had the managerial responsibility.  
The number of observations that are used in the analyses and the selected descriptive statistics 
of the relevant variables for this study are presented in Table 3. Table 3 also displays the 90/10, 
90/50 and 50/10 percentile ratios of hourly wages for men and women. The smaller the ratio is 
the more compression takes place. As the 50/10 percentile ratio is quite lower relative to the 
90/50 ratio, it can be said that the more compression took place on the lower tail of the wage 
distribution in November 2006 for both men and women.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lastly Figure 4 presents kernel density estimates of the distributions of hourly basic gross wages 
for females and males, to have a visual summary of the wage distributions. Figure 4 shows the 
distinction between female’ and males’ wage distributions. The males’ wage distribution peaks 
relatively high with a lower dispersion around the mode compared to females’. The females’ 
wage distribution lies within the males’ distribution around the mode. Both genders’ wage 
distributions peak at the 25th and 75th quantiles and females’ wage distribution lies under the 
males’ distribution around these quantiles. The two genders’ hourly wage distributions overlap 
at the upper and lower tail for the interval 2 TRY and 4 TRY. 
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Figure 4. Kernel density estimates of the wage distributions 
IV. QUANTILE REGRESSION MODEL  
A new growing quantile regression empirical literature shows that the wage distribution needs 
a more complex analysis than considering the impact of covariates only upon the mean of the 
conditional wage distribution. The quantile regressions model, introduced by Koenker and 
Bassett (1978), seeks to extend the analysis to the whole wage distribution and provides a more 
complete picture of the covariate effects. In this section, the quantile regression method for 
modeling the wage distributions and the corresponding decomposition technique is discussed.  
For this purpose, let {𝑦𝑖|𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛} be a random sample of (log) wage units in the population 
of size 𝑛 with the distribution function 𝐹. For any 𝜃in the interval (0,1) the 𝜃th quantile of the 
(log) wage distribution can be defined as any number 𝜉𝜃 ∈ ℝ that fulfills: 
𝐹𝑌(𝜉𝜃
−) =  𝑃(𝑌 <  𝜉𝜃) ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝑃(𝑌 ≤  𝜉𝜃) = 𝐹𝑌(𝜉𝜃).            (1) 
The smallest element of the solution set to the (1) is chosen to avoid the problems that may 
arise due to the non-uniqueness problem. Then the quantile function is defined as:  
𝑄 𝑌(𝜃)  =  𝐹𝑌
−1𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝑦| 𝐹𝑌(𝑦) ≥ 𝜃},   0 < 𝜃 < 1             (2) 
and the empirical quantile function is: 
?̂? 𝑌(𝜃) =  ?̂?𝑌
−1𝑖𝑛𝑓 {𝑦| 
#(𝑦𝑖≤𝑦)
𝑛
≥ 𝜃} ,   0 < 𝜃 < 1             (3) 
0
2
4
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hourly basic gross wage (TRY)
female
male
Notes: Epanechnikov kernel estimator, optimal bandwidth = 0.0231
Sample: Hourly basic gross wage from 2 TRY  to 4 TRY in November 2006
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Koenker and Bassett (1978) proposed an alternative method to this procedure such that the 
quantile in question is the solution to the following optimization problem: 
?̂? 𝑌(𝜃) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 [∑ 𝜃|𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉𝜃|𝑖∈{𝑖:𝑦𝑖≥𝜉𝜃} + ∑ (1 − 𝜃)|𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉𝜃|𝑖∈{𝑖:𝑦𝑖<𝜉𝜃} ]                           (4) 
This new approach to determine empirical quantiles is convenient for an extension to regression 
settings. For this purpose let 𝑋 = {𝑥𝑖𝑗|𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑘} be the matrix of 𝑘 covariates 
of this sample, which includes a constant, a gender dummy, educational attainment level, age, 
age squared divided by 100 and seniority. Then the 𝜃th quantile of the (log) wage distribution 
conditional on the covariates is symbolized as 𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑖|𝑋) and defined by: 
𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑖|𝑋) = 𝑥𝑖′𝛽(𝜃),  𝜃 ∈ (0,1).                             (5) 
where 𝛽(𝜃) is a vector of 𝜃th quantile regression coefficients and 𝑥𝑖′ is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ row of matrix 𝑋. 
For a given 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), the quantile regression estimator of 𝛽(𝜃), ?̂?(𝜃) is the solution of the 
following minimization problem (Koenker and Bassett, 1978): 
?̂?(𝜃) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 [∑ 𝜃|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖′𝛽(𝜃)|𝑖∈{𝑖:𝑦𝑖≥𝑥𝑖
′𝛽(𝜃)} + ∑ (1 − 𝜃)|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝛽(𝜃)|𝑖∈{𝑖:𝑦𝑖<𝑥𝑖
′𝛽(𝜃)} ]    
 
 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝜌𝜃(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖′𝛽(𝜃))𝑖                                                                                    (6) 
 
where 𝜌𝜃(𝑢) = [(𝜃 − Ι(𝑢 < 0))𝑢] is a check function and Ι(∙) is the usual indicator function. 
In other words, the 𝜃th quantile regression estimator of 𝛽, ?̂?(𝜃), can be estimated by minimizing 
the average of asymmetrically weighted absolute errors, with 𝜃 weight on positive errors and 
(𝜃 − 1) on negative errors.  
However as the check function is not differentiable at the origin, the minimization problem 
shown at equation (6) does not have an explicit solution. But it can be shown that the quantile 
regression can be reformulated in a linear programming representation2. This linear 
programming representation guarantees the quantile regression estimator to be obtained in a 
finite number of simplex iterations. The number of simplex iterations is significantly reduced 
                                                          
2 See Buchinsky (1998). 
𝛽(𝜃) 
𝛽(𝜃) 
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by the manipulations based on the several equivariance properties of the quantile regression 
estimator3.  
The interpretation of the quantile regression estimator is similar to the least square estimator. 
Considering the partial derivative of the 𝜃th quantile of the (log) wage distribution conditional 
on the covariates with respect to one of the regressors, say 𝑗𝑡ℎ, 𝜕𝑄𝜃(𝑦𝑖|𝑋) 𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑗⁄  represents the 
marginal change at the 𝜃th quantile of 𝑦𝑖 due to a (ceteris paribus) marginal change in the 𝑗
th 
covariate 𝑥𝑖𝑗. The standard errors and confidence intervals for the quantile regression 
coefficient estimates can be obtained by either using the asymptotic standard error of the 
estimator or by bootstrapping (Koenker and Hallock, 2000). The elementary asymptotic theory 
provided by Koenker and Bassett (1978) is based on the assumption of independently and 
identically distributed errors (𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑.). In the more realistic case, when the errors are not 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑., 
estimators can be obtained by various re-sampling methods, namely bootstrapping. 
V. DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS USING QUANTILE REGRESSIONS 
Following the traditional Oaxaca (1973) decomposition of effects on mean wages, Machado 
and Mata (2005) proposed a decomposition method combining quantile regressions and the 
bootstrapping approach. This decomposition method is based on, in the first step, the estimation 
of the conditional wage distribution by quantile regressions and in the second, the estimation 
of the marginal density functions of wages that is consistent with the conditional distribution 
defined by equation (6). For this purpose, Machado and Mata (2005) employed the integral 
theorem from elementary statistics: if 𝑈 is a uniform random variable on [0,1], then 𝐹−1(𝑈) 
has the distribution of 𝐹. Thus if 𝜃1, 𝜃2, … , 𝜃𝑚 are randomly drawn from a uniform (0,1) 
distribution, the 𝑚 estimates of the conditional quantiles at a given 𝑋,  {𝑥𝑖′?̂?(𝜃𝑖)}𝑖=1
𝑚
will 
constitute a random sample from the estimated conditional distribution of 𝑦𝑖 at given 𝑋. Then, 
to get a sample from the marginal, rather than keeping 𝑋 fixed, a random sample of the 
covariates can be drawn from the population. Formally, the steps of this procedure can be 
summarized as: 
1. Generate a random sample of size m from a 𝑈[0,1]: 𝜃1, 𝜃2, … , 𝜃𝑚. 
                                                          
3 See Koenker and Bassett (1978), Buchinsky (1998), Koenker and Hallock (2000) for equivariance properties of 
the quantile regression estimator. 
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2. For the data set and each {𝜃𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑚  estimate 𝑄𝜃𝑖(𝑦|𝑋) to get 𝑚 estimates of quantile regression 
coefficients ?̂?(𝜃𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑚. 
3. Generate a random sample of size 𝑚 with replacement from the covariates, denoted by 
{?̃?𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑚 . 
4. Finally {?̃?𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖′?̂?(𝜃𝑖)}𝑖=1
𝑚
 is a random sample of size 𝑚 from the desired distribution.  
In particular we are interested in two types of counterfactual wage distribution, males’ and 
females’. In other words, to reveal the gender wage gap, we want to simulate the marginal wage 
distribution that would have prevailed for females if all covariates had been distributed as 
males’. In this case the above procedure is run as: 
1. Generate a random sample of size m from a 𝑈[0,1]: 𝜃1, 𝜃2, … , 𝜃𝑚. 
2. For the data set and each {𝜃𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑚  estimate the quantile regression coefficients: ?̂?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃𝑖) , 
?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑚 , for females and males respectively. 
3. Generate for each gender a random sample of size m with replacement from the covariates, 
denoted by {?̃?𝑖
𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒}
𝑖=1
𝑚
 and {?̃?𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒}
𝑖=1
𝑚
. 
4. {?̃?𝑖
𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 = ?̃?𝑖
𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒′?̂?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃𝑖)}
𝑖=1
𝑚
 and {?̃?𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 = ?̃?𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒′?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃𝑖)}
𝑖=1
𝑚
 are random 
samples of size 𝑚 from the marginal wage distributions consistent with the linear model 
defined in equation (5).  
5. Generate a random sample of the counterfactual distribution. {?̃?𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒′?̂?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃𝑖)}
𝑖=1
𝑚
 is a 
random sample from the wage distribution that would have prevailed for females if all 
covariates had been distributes as males’. 
The step 5 can be repeated to generate the second counterfactual density by simply reversing 
the roles of females and males. This way, two counterfactual densities are obtained: (1) the 
female log wage density that would arise if women were given men’s characteristics but having 
their own wages and (2) the density that would arise if women retained their own characteristics 
but were paid like their male counterparts (Albrecht, et al., 2003).  
Then the decomposition of the difference between quantiles of the male and female wage 
distribution is given by: 
𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃) − 𝑋𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒?̂?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃) = (?̃?𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 − ?̃?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)?̂?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃) + ?̃?𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒[?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃) − ?̂?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝜃)]   (6) 
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where the first component is the contribution of the covariates and the second component is the 
contribution of the coefficients to the difference between the 𝜃th quantile of the male wage 
distribution and the 𝜃th quantile of the female wage distribution.  
VI. RESULTS FROM QUANTILE REGRESSION AND DECOMPOSITION 
ANALYSIS 
In this section the results from quantile regression estimates and the decomposition of observed 
gender wage gaps are presented. Firstly, following Albrecht et al. (2003), for various 
specifications, a series of quantile regression estimations is performed to explore the gender 
gap that remains unexplained at the various quantiles of the wage distribution by using the 
pooled dataset of males and females. Secondly, the quantile regressions for females and males 
are estimated separately and the difference between returns of individual and firm 
characteristics at the various points in female and male wage distributions is presented. Lastly, 
the decomposition results of the difference between the male and female wage distribution is 
displayed.  
Pooled Quantile Regression Results with Gender Dummies  
In this part of the analyses, a series of quantile regressions are estimated using the total male 
and female mixed sample. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors of the gender 
dummy in each specification for the fifth, tenth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, ninetieth 
and ninety-fifth percentiles are presented in Table 4. The standard errors of the quantile 
regression coefficients in parentheses are obtained by bootstrapping method4. For comparison, 
the OLS estimate of the gender dummy coefficient in each model is displayed in the last column 
of the Table 4. The gender dummy coefficients in Table 4 present the gender gap that remains 
unexplained at the various quantiles of the wage distribution after controlling for the covariates 
                                                          
4 Among the commercial software packages, Stata provides basic functionalities to estimate the quantile regression 
estimators and their standard errors. The command qreg provides the asymptotic standard errors based on the 
assumption of 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. errors.  In particular, the reported standard errors in this study are based on the pair wise 
bootstrapping where pairs, (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, are randomly drawn from the original sample with replacement. 
As the observations of our analyses come from a simple random stratified sampling method, the pair wise 
bootstrapping approach, which is based on the independently but not identically distributed setting, is consistent. 
For this purpose, the command for simultaneous quantile regressions sqreg is used and the re-sampling procedure 
is repeated 100 times, to yield a sample whose covariance matrix is a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix 
of the original estimator.  
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in each specification. A negative coefficient implies that a negative unexplained gender gap 
remains even after the labor market characteristics in the model are controlled for. The lower 
the coefficient is, the more disadvantageous the women are. On the other hand, expanding the 
controls from one model to another, aims at exploring the change in the gender dummy 
coefficient from the simplest model to the expanded model in various quantiles.  
The first specification named as observed gender gap is the basic model where log hourly wage 
is regressed on the gender dummy. Basic control variables include the individual specific 
characteristics, such as age, age square divided by 100, seniority and educational attainment. 
Extended controls further include the employment type variable. Firm characteristics include 
the size and the coverage of the workplace under collective labor bargaining. The eight 
occupation dummies are based on one-digit classification and the twelve economic activity 
dummies are based on the two digit classification. 
When the rows of the Table 4 are compared, it can be seen that expanding the model has an 
impact on the gender dummy coefficient. Firstly, the comparison of second and third rows of 
the Table 4 suggests that adding employment type to the model has no clear impact on the 
gender gap at the lower quantiles. At the upper tail of the wage distribution, the gender gap 
slightly increases after adding employment type as a control variable. Secondly, the pair wise 
comparison of the third and fourth models in Table 4 shows that, when economic activity is 
controlled for, the gender wage gap at the upper tail of the wage distribution (90th and 95th 
quantiles) increases. Conversely, including economic activity as an explanatory variable 
decreases the gap at the median and at the 75th quantile. Moreover, adding occupation as a 
control variable increases the gender wage gap, as revealed by the pair wise comparison of 
models four and five at each quantile in which this coefficient is significant. On the other hand, 
the OLS coefficient suggests that there is no effect of controlling for employment type and 
occupation at the mean of the wage distribution.  The fifth and sixth models comparison suggest 
that controlling for the firm characteristics increases the gap at the bottom and the median, as 
well as the mean, while decreasing it at the top of the wage distribution.  
One of the striking features of the results in Table 4 is that the gender dummy coefficient is 
decreasing in each model, except the first specification, as the quantile increases. In other 
words, the gender wage gap that remains unexplained is higher in the upper tail of the wage 
distribution than at the median and the lower tail. In the first specification, where none of the 
controls are taken into account, women seem to be positively discriminated in the upper tail. 
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Table 4. Gender dummy coefficients using alternative specifications            
                      
Specification 
 Quantile regressions (percentage of the conditional wage distribution)  OLS 
  5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th   mean 
(1) Observed gender gap  0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,010** -0,018** 0,002 0,074***  -0,002 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,004) (0,008) (0,007) (0,008)  (0,003) 
(2) Gender gap with basic control variables  -0,000 -0,000 -0,009*** -0,024*** -0,058*** -0,077*** -0,067***  -0,051*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007)  (0,002) 
(3) Gender gap with extended control variables  -0,000 -0,000 -0,010*** -0,023*** -0,058*** -0,078*** -0,069***  -0,051*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,006)  (0,002) 
(4) Gender gap with extended control variables and sector  -0,000 -0,001* -0,009*** -0,019*** -0,056*** -0,082*** -0,082***  -0,055*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007)  (0,002) 
(5) Gender gap with extended control variables, sector and occupation  -0,000 -0,002*** -0,010*** -0,023*** -0,058*** -0,095*** -0,096***  -0,055*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007)  (0,002) 
(6) Gender gap with extended control variables, sector, occupation and firm 
characteristics  -0,006*** -0,007*** -0,014*** -0,024*** -0,043*** -0,062*** -0,075***  -0,047*** 
    (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005)   (0,002) 
Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006.  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For quantile regressions bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are reported.        
*, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance level respectively 
1. Observed gender gap includes gender dummy without any control variables. Basic control variables include age, age2/100, and seniority and education level. Extended controls include additional to basic 
controls dummy for employment type. Firm characteristics are firm size and cover of collective bargaining. 
2. 8 major occupation group (ISCO, 88) dummies are: 1. Legislators, senior officials and managers, 2. Professionals, 3. Technicians and associate professionals, 4. Clerks, 5. Service workers and shop and market 
sales workers, 6. Craft and related trade workers, 7. Plant and machine operators and assemblers, 8. Elementary occupations  
3 12 economic activity (NACE Rev. 1.1) dummies are: 1. Mining and quarrying, 2. Manufacturing , 3. Electricity, gas and water supply, 4. Construction, 5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and  personal and household goods, 6. Hotels and restaurants, 7. Transport, storage and communication, 8. Financial intermediation, 9. Real estate, renting and business activities, 10. Education, 
11. Health and social work, 12. Other community, social and personal service activities 
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However, when we start to control for relevant labor market characteristics, this result is 
reversed, already after the basic controls (second row of Table 4). This effect, as described in 
Section III, is a consequence of the composition of employees. As women are concentrated in 
the higher education groups, the observed raw gender gap suggests that women are positively 
discriminated at the upper tail of the wage distribution.  
Another salient feature of the results displayed in Table 4 is the insignificance of the gender 
dummy coefficient for the fifth percentile in most of the models, and for the tenth in some, 
except the one that controls for the firm characteristics (6th row of Table 4). This implies that 
there is no significant evidence for a gender wage gap at the lowest quantile of the wage 
distribution when firm characteristics are not controlled for. Despite the gender dummy not 
being significant at the 5th quantile in any model, the coefficient turns significant already from 
the 25th quantile onwards. When the firm characteristics are added to the controls, interestingly, 
the gender wage gap increases in the lower quantiles, namely, 5th, 10th and 25th while it is 
reduced in absolute terms in higher, 90th and 95th, quantiles. Considering the significant effect 
of the firm characteristics to the marginal effect of gender dummy on log wage distribution, in 
the further steps of the analyses the last specification in Table 4 is preferred. In so doing, we 
are able to control observed firm specific factors, which have a significant effect on the 
magnitude of the gender wage gap along the wage distribution.   
Lastly, the equality of the gender dummy coefficients is tested for various combinations of 
quantile pairs in each model presented in table 4. In all specifications, the equality of the seven 
gender dummy coefficients is rejected at one percent significance level. Furthermore, in all 
models, except the last two, the gender dummy coefficient at the 5th-10th and 90th-95th quantile 
pairs are not statistically different, at the 1% significance level. The difference between gender 
dummy coefficients at the 90th and 95th quantiles in the fifth model is not statistically significant, 
while in the sixth specification this difference is not statistically significant only at the 5th and 
10th quantiles.  
On the other hand, the estimated OLS coefficient for gender dummy is between – 4.7% and -
5.5% if we consider all the specifications from the second to the sixth. For each specification 
this coefficient is close to the one that is estimated from the 75th quantile regression. However, 
the coefficients at the lowest and highest quantiles, even at the median, are quite different than 
the OLS estimates. In other words, OLS estimates are not sufficient to capture the marginal 
effect of the gender dummy on log hourly wages at the lower and the upper tails of the wage 
distribution, irrespective to the specification.  
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The complete set of quantile regression and OLS estimates of the coefficients for regression on 
the extended control variables, sector, and occupation as well as firm characteristics is displayed 
in Table 55. As Table 5 presents, the effects of age and age square on log hourly wages are 
constant at the 5th, 10th and 50th quantile, whereas it increases at the upper tail of the distribution. 
The marginal effect of seniority on wages is 0.7 % at the 5th quantile and 10th quantiles. This 
effect increases to around 3 % at the upper tail of the wage distribution. At each quantile, 
estimated returns to education increase with the level of education. The same applies for the 
OLS estimation results. For instance, the wage of an employee who completed the primary 
education or attended a secondary school is 0.7% higher than for a worker who either attended 
primary school or no school, at the 5th quantile, controlling for age, gender, seniority, education, 
occupation and sector as well as firm characteristics. Whereas this difference is 5.4 percentage 
points between a university graduate and a worker who either attended primary school or no 
school. Similarly, at the 95th quantile this difference turns to be 9.8% for an employee who 
completed the primary education or attended a secondary school and 93.4% for a university 
graduate. Then again, at each education level, estimated returns to education are similar for the 
lower quantiles, while it starts to increase at the median noticeably and continue to increase as 
we move up the wage distribution.  
The coefficient of the fixed term employment is – 0.024 at the 5th quantile while it is – 0.001 at 
the median and – 0.063 at the highest quantile. This implies that employees working with a 
fixed term contract are earning 2.4 percentage points less than the ones who are working with 
an indefinite contract at the 5th quantile, controlling for age, seniority, education, occupation 
and sector as well as firm characteristics. The fixed term penalty decreases through the wage 
distribution up to median but start to increase after it as we move up to the upper tail of the 
wage distribution.  
Moreover at each quantile, there is a pay advantage of workers who work in large workplaces. 
Accordingly, of two workers with the same gender, age, seniority, level of education, type of 
contract, working in the same sector and occupation, and both covered with the collective labor 
agreement, the one in the largest workplace earns 10.6% more than the one in a workplace with 
less than 50 employees at the 5th quantile. This gap is 32.6% at the median and 43.6% at the 
highest quantile. 
                                                          
5 The complete set of estimations in the rest of the specifications are presented in Tables A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4 
in appendix. 
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Table 5. Pooled quantile regressions with gender dummy 
            
Variables 
  Quantile regressions (percentage of the conditional wage distribution)   OLS 
  5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th   mean 
Female  -0,006*** -0,007*** -0,014*** -0,024*** -0,043*** -0,062*** -0,075***  -0,047*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005)  (0,002) 
Age  0,002*** -0,000 -0,001*** 0,003*** 0,011*** 0,032*** 0,046***  0,023*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)  (0,001) 
Age2/100  -0,001** 0,001*** 0,002*** -0,002*** -0,010*** -0,028*** -0,042***  -0,022*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003)  (0,001) 
Seniority  0,007*** 0,007*** 0,013*** 0,025*** 0,034*** 0,033*** 0,032***  0,026*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001)  (0,000) 
Primary education and  
secondary school  0,007*** 0,006*** 0,011*** 0,018*** 0,042*** 0,085*** 0,098***  0,049*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007)  (0,002) 
High school  0,014*** 0,010*** 0,016*** 0,026*** 0,067*** 0,154*** 0,207***  0,084*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,006)  (0,002) 
Vocational high school  0,035*** 0,032*** 0,038*** 0,071*** 0,186*** 0,276*** 0,336***  0,173*** 
  (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005) (0,008)  (0,003) 
Higher education  0,054*** 0,056*** 0,078*** 0,342*** 0,617*** 0,823*** 0,934***  0,447*** 
  (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,006) (0,006) (0,010) (0,011)  (0,003) 
Fixed term employment  -0,024*** -0,008*** -0,002 -0,001 -0,016*** -0,051*** -0,063***  -0,029*** 
  (0,006) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003) (0,006) (0,009)  (0,004) 
50-249 employees  0,040*** 0,022*** 0,029*** 0,045*** 0,164*** 0,234*** 0,235***  0,151*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,005) (0,006)  (0,002) 
250-499 employees  0,067*** 0,052*** 0,058*** 0,148*** 0,307*** 0,344*** 0,311***  0,256*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,004) (0,005) (0,009)  (0,003) 
500-999 employees  0,085*** 0,066*** 0,074*** 0,197*** 0,344*** 0,358*** 0,326***  0,290*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005) (0,006) (0,008)  (0,003) 
1000+ employees  0,106*** 0,089*** 0,209*** 0,326*** 0,440*** 0,461*** 0,436**  0,376*** 
  (0,002) (0,001) (0,004) (0,004) (0,006) (0,007) (0,008)  (0,003) 
Collective agreement  0,124*** 0,227*** 0,418*** 0,384*** 0,270*** 0,229*** 0,210***  0,258*** 
  (0,003) (0,005) (0,004) (0,004) (0,005) (0,006) (0,007)  (0,003) 
Constant  0,866*** 0,936*** 1,033*** 1,282*** 1,483*** 1,391*** 1,300***  0,901*** 
  (0,009) (0,005) (0,006) (0,011) (0,014) (0,026) (0,035)  (0,012) 
Number of observations  302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714  302 714 
Pseudo-R2   0,06 0,07 0,15 0,33 0,43 0,42 0,41   0,53 
Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006.  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For quantile regressions bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are reported.  
*, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively 
1.The regressions include 8 major occupation group (ISCO, 88) dummies: 1. Legislators, senior officials and managers, 2. Professionals, 
3. Technicians and associate professionals, 4. Clerks, 5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers, 6.Craft and related trade 
workers, 7. Plant and machine operators and assemblers, 8. Elementary occupations 
2.The regressions include 12 economic activity (NACE Rev. 1.1) dummies: 1. Mining and quarrying, 2. Manufacturing , 3. Electricity, 
gas and water supply, 4. Construction, 5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and  personal and household 
goods, 6. Hotels and restaurants, 7. Transport, storage and communication, 8. Financial intermediation, 9. Real estate, renting and 
business activities, 10. Education, 11. Health and social work, 12. Other community, social and personal service activities 
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If a similar analysis is performed for the coefficient estimate of the coverage of the workplace 
under collective labor agreement, there is a pay advantage for the workers who are working in 
a workplace that is under the collective labor agreement. The highest is at 25th quantile of the 
wage distribution with 41.8% difference and second at the median with 38.4%. The lowest 
difference exists at the bottom and the top of the difference, 12.4% and 21% at the 5th and 95th 
quantiles, respectively.  
Quantile Regression Results by Gender 
In the analyses, the quantile regressions are estimated separately for females and males to 
examine if a difference between the returns to individual and firm characteristics for women 
and men exists at the various points of their respective wage distributions. Table 6 displays the 
estimated coefficients of the extended control variables, such as age, age squared, seniority, 
education and type of contract, as well as the firm characteristics, by the quantile log wage 
regressions separately for males and females at various quantiles.  
For both genders, the coefficients on age are higher at the upper tail of the wage distribution 
than the lower tail and the median while for women these coefficients are higher than for men 
at all the quantiles of the wage distribution. An additional year of seniority is associated with a 
similar increase in pay for males and females at the lower tail of the wage distribution, at the 
median and at the 75th quantile. However at the upper tail of the distribution there is a pay 
advantage of women who have an additional year of seniority than men around 0.4% at the 90th 
quantile and 0.7% at the 95th quantile. On the other hand women get a higher return to education 
than men at all the quantiles for the primary education level. The same applies for the high 
school graduates. In contrast, among vocational high school and university graduates, men 
realize higher return to education than women at the lower tail and the median of the wage 
distribution. For vocational high school graduates at the 75th quantile, for the higher education 
level at the 95th quantile women start to get a bigger payoff than men. 
The coefficient of the fixed term employment is – 0.016 and – 0.044 at the 5th quantile while it 
is – 0.049 and – 0.054 at the 90th quantile for men and women respectively. This implies that 
female employees that are working with a fixed term contract are earning 0.5% less than their 
male counterparts at the 90th quantile. This gap is even higher at the lower quantiles, with 2.8% 
at the 5th quantile.   
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Table 6. Quantile regressions by gender  
                          
Variables 
  Quantile regressions (percentage of the conditional wage distribution)   O OLS  
 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th mean 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
                  
Age  0,001* 0,004*** -0,001** 0,002*** -0,002*** 0,003*** 0,001*** 0,009*** 0,006*** 0,027*** 0,028*** 0,049*** 0,041*** 0,061*** 0,019*** 0,038*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,002) (0,004) (0,001) (0,001) 
Age2  -0,000 -0,005*** 0,002*** -0,002*** 0,004*** -0,003*** -0,000 -0,011***** -0,004*** -0,032*** -0,024*** -0,054*** -0,036*** -0,063*** -0,017*** -0,042*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,002) (0,004) (0,003) (0,007) (0,001) (0,002) 
Seniority  0,007*** 0,006*** 0,007*** 0,006*** 0,013*** 0,012*** 0,025*** 0,025*** 0,033*** 0,033*** 0,033*** 0,037*** 0,030*** 0,037*** 0,025*** 0,026*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,000) (0,000) 
Primary education 
and secondary school  0,006*** 0,010*** 0,006*** 0,011*** 0,010*** 0,018*** 0,016*** 0,035*** 0,033*** 0,091*** 0,067*** 0,155*** 0,084*** 0,193*** 0,041*** 0,108*** 
  (0,002) (0,003) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,002) (0,005) (0,004) (0,009) (0,007) (0,013) (0,003) (0,007) 
High school  0,012*** 0,015*** 0,010*** 0,014*** 0,013*** 0,024*** 0,021*** 0,043*** 0,050*** 0,124*** 0,131*** 0,230*** 0,175*** 0,308*** 0,069*** 0,139*** 
  (0,002)  (0,003) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003) (0,006) (0,006) (0,012) (0,008) (0,015) (0,002) (0,006) 
Vocational high 
school  0,040*** 0,013*** 0,036*** 0,016*** 0,038*** 0,033*** 0,072*** 0,064*** 0,177*** 0,210*** 0,268*** 0,298*** 0,331*** 0,355*** 0,168*** 0,189*** 
  (0,002) (0,004) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) (0,005) (0,012) (0,007) (0,016) (0,010) (0,020) (0,003) (0,008) 
Higher education  0,055*** 0,046*** 0,057*** 0,049*** 0,091*** 0,067*** 0,380*** 0,281*** 0,641*** 0,590*** 0,828*** 0,819*** 0,938*** 0,942*** 0,458*** 0,437*** 
  (0,002) (0,004) (0,001) (0,003) (0,004) (0,003) (0,006) (0,008) (0,008) (0,012) (0,010) (0,016) (0,014) (0,017) (0,003) (0,007) 
Fixed term 
employment  -0,016** -0,044*** -0,004** -0,021*** 0,002 -0,019*** -0,000 -0,005 -0,013*** -0,029*** -0,049*** -0,054** -0,078*** 0,014 
-
0,025*** -0,059*** 
  (0,007) (0,008) (0,002) (0,004) (0,002) (0,005) (0,002) (0,005) (0,003) (0,007) (0,006) (0,018) (0,010) (0,027) (0,004) (0,010) 
50-249 employees  0,040*** 0,043*** 0,020*** 0,025*** 0,027*** 0,035*** 0,042*** 0,053*** 0,186*** 0,104*** 0,252*** 0,154*** 0,252*** 0,169*** 0,150*** 0,159*** 
  (0,002) (0,003) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005) (0,005) (0,010) (0,008) (0,012) (0,002) (0,004) 
250-499 employees  0,068*** 0,063*** 0,051*** 0,050*** 0,056*** 0,060*** 0,164*** 0,112*** 0,340*** 0,199*** 0,371*** 0,227*** 0,338*** 0,220*** 0,262*** 0,239*** 
  (0,002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,001) (0,003) (0,004) (0,006) (0,006) (0,010) (0,007) (0,013) (0,009) (0,015) (0,003) (0,006) 
500-999 employees  0,087*** 0,081*** 0,068*** 0,059*** 0,081*** 0,064*** 0,226*** 0,118*** 0,377*** 0,228*** 0,381*** 0,272*** 0,352*** 0,258*** 0,302*** 0,261*** 
  (0,002) (0,003) (0,001) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,005) (0,007) (0,005) (0,013) (0,007) (0,017) (0,010) (0,019) (0,003) (0,007) 
1000+ employees  0,111*** 0,097*** 0,097*** 0,073*** 0,235*** 0,121*** 0,360*** 0,218*** 0,482*** 0,282*** 0,495*** 0,298*** 0,470*** 0,307*** 0,395*** 0,312*** 
  (0,002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,005) (0,008) (0,005) (0,007) (0,006) (0,013) (0,009) (0,017) (0,011) (0,017) (0,003) (0,006) 
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Collective agreement  0,134*** 0,080*** 0,250*** 0,122*** 0,426*** 0,286*** 0,375*** 0,345*** 0,259*** 0,268*** 0,225*** 0,216*** 0,211*** 0,200*** 0,258*** 0,221*** 
  (0,003) (0,007) (0,007) (0,011) (0,005) (0,012) (0,004) (0,010) (0,005) (0,012) (0,006) (0,022) (0,007) (0,022) (0,003) (0,008) 
Constant  0,873*** 0,857*** 0,943*** 0,916*** 1,049*** 0,984*** 1,284*** 1,243*** 1,526*** 1,296*** 1,416*** 1,121*** 1,356*** 0,989*** 0,962*** 0,663*** 
  (0,010) (0,019) (0,005) (0,010) (0,006) (0,017) (0,012) (0,035) (0,016) (0,045) (0,027) (0,063) (0,039) (0,099) (0,014) (0,033) 
Number of 
observations  237 198 65 516 237 198 65 516 237 198 65 516 237 198 65 516 237 198 65 516 237 198 65 516 237 198 65 516 237 198 65 516 
Pseudo-R2   0,06 0,05 0,08 0,04 0,17 0,11 0,35 0,28 0,44 0,40 0,43 0,41 0,42 0,41 0,54 0,48 
Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For quantile regressions bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are reported. 
*, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively 
1.The regressions include 9 major occupation group (ISCO, 88) dummies: 1. Legislators, senior officials and managers, 2. Professionals, 3. Technicians and associate professionals, 4. Clerks, 5. Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers, 6. Craft and related trade workers, 7. Plant and machine operators and assemblers, 8. Elementary occupations 
2.The regressions also include 12 economic activity (NACE Rev. 1.1) dummies: 1. Mining and quarrying, 2. Manufacturing, 3. Electricity, gas and water supply, 4. Construction, 5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods, 6. Hotels and restaurants, 7. Transport, storage and communication, 8. Financial intermediation, 9. Real estate, renting and business activities, 10. Education, 11. Health and social work, 
12. Other community, social and personal service activities 
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In terms of firm characteristics, first, women have a pay penalty in large firms with more than 500 
employees. In the small and medium size firms, at the lower tail of the wage distribution men have 
a pay penalty, but men start to get a bigger payoff than women at the small size firms starting from 
the 75th quantile and at firms with 250-499 employees starting from the median. Second, after 
controlling for the age, seniority, level of education, type of contract, sector and occupation, and 
size of the workplace, male employees have a pay advantage than women in workplaces those 
covered under collective bargaining agreements, except the 75th quantile at which women have an 
advantage of 0.9%.  
The OLS estimates of the coefficients are reported in the last two columns of Table 6. It is clear 
that, OLS is not adequate to analyze these patterns of differences between the returns of individual 
and firm characteristics at the various points of female and male wage distributions. 
Decomposition Results for Gender Wage Gap Using Quantile Regressions  
So far we have dealt with the quantile regression estimates but now we turn our attention to the 
decomposition of the observed gender gap into two components: one due to the characteristics and 
the other to the coefficients6. Given the size of the dataset and the computational limitations, it was 
not feasible to perform the decomposition on the whole sample. Therefore, in this part of the 
analysis a random sample of the data consisting of 20% of the whole data set is used.  
For decomposition analyses, first, the counterfactual densities for several alternative specifications 
are constructed assuming that women have the male labor market characteristics but are rewarded 
for these characteristics as female employees. Table 7 shows the counterfactual gap that is the gap 
between male log wage density and the counterfactual density for several alternative specifications 
presented in the previous section. The first row of the Table 7 gives the observed gender gap at the 
various quantiles of the wage distribution that is identical to the one in Table 4. The counterfactual 
gender gaps in Table 7 are the gaps between male log wage densities and the counterfactual 
densities constructed by estimating the betas using only women and then assuming that women 
have the male distribution of labor market characteristics.  
                                                          
6 The decomposition of differences in wage distributions is applied using the Stata command rqdeco (See Melly, 
2007). Melly (2006) shows that this procedure is numerically identical to the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition 
method when the number of simulations used in Machado and Mata procedure goes to infinity. In the decomposition 
procedure of our study, rather than taking 𝑚 random draws from (0,1) and estimating 𝑚 quantile regression 
coefficients, the decomposition is performed for the 99 percentile differences in wages between men and women. 100 
quantile regressions are estimated in the first step and the standard errors for the counterfactual densities are obtained 
by repeating the procedure 100 times. 
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The first row of Table 7 suggests that there is no clear evidence of an observed gender gap at the 
lower tail of the wage distribution. Moreover at the upper tail of the distribution women have a 
pay advantage. However the counterfactual gaps for several alternative specifications suggest the 
reverse. In most of the models, the counterfactual gap is positive at the lower quantiles while this 
turns negative already from the 25th quantile onwards. For the last specification, presented in the 
last row of Table 7, the counterfactual gap is negative at all the quantiles of the wage distribution. 
This implies, despite women were given men’s characteristics but having their own wages, they 
would earn less than their male counterparts at the upper tail of the wage distribution. Moreover, 
the counterfactual gap is rising throughout the wage distribution irrespective to the specification. 
The results reported in Table 7 can be compared with the gender dummy coefficients in Table 4. 
The gender dummy coefficients in Table 4 that give the gender gap controlling for various labor 
market characteristics but assume that return to these characteristics are the same for males and 
females. The common feature of Table 4 and Table 7 is the rise of the gap throughout the wage 
distribution. However, the main difference between the two tables is the dispersion of the gender 
gap throughout the wage distribution in each specification. The distinction of gender gap between 
the lower and the higher quantiles is sharper in Table 7 than in Table 4. A similar pattern is 
observed regardless of the specification. For instance, the last row of Table 4 suggests that, when 
age, seniority, education, employment type, occupation and sector as well as the firm 
Table 7. Counterfactual gender gaps for alternative specifications    
                  
Specification 
 Quantile regressions (percentage of the unconditional wage distribution) 
  5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th 
(1) Observed gender gap  0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,010
 -0,018 0,002 0,074  
          
(2) Counterfactual  gap using basic  
 control variables  0,002 0,005 -0,004 -0,054 -0,106 -0,105 -0,109  
          
(3) Counterfactual  gap using extended 
control variables  0,003 0,006 -0,004 -0,053 -0,107 -0,106 -0,110  
          
(4) Counterfactual gap using extended 
control variables and sector  -0,001 0,002 -0,004 -0,042 -0,106 -0,128 -0,144  
          
(5) Counterfactual gap using extended 
control variables, sector and occupation  0,000 0,003 -0,004 -0,045 -0,120 -0,140 -0,152  
          
(6) Counterfactual gap using extended 
control variables, sector, occupation and 
firm characteristics  
-0,010 -0,012 -0,010 -0,033 -0,097 -0,099 -0,107 
 
   
Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006.  
Note: Counterfactual densities are constructed assuming that women have the characteristics of male employees and returns to 
these characteristics of female employees using a random sample of the data consisting of 20% of the data.    
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characteristics are controlled for, the gender gap is 0.6% at the 5th quantile while it is 7.5% at the 
95th quantile. But Table 7 presents after controlling for all these variables the gender gap accounts 
for 1% at the bottom whereas 10.7% at the top quantile. For a more detailed understanding of the 
role of returns to the worker attributes shaping the gender wage gap, for the last specification in 
Table 7,  the observed gender gap and two alternative counterfactual gaps  are reported in Table 
8. Additionally, Table 8 presents the bootstrapped standard errors of these gaps. The first 
counterfactual gender gap and the observed gender gap that is reported in Table 8 are identical 
with the last and the first row of Table 7, respectively. The second counterfactual gap is based on 
the density that would arise if women employees retained their own characteristics but were paid 
like their male counterparts. Both of the counterfactual gaps are negative and statistically 
significant at all the quantiles of the wage distribution. Figure 5 presents a visual display of these 
counterfactual gaps within the 95 percent confidence interval.  
Table 8. Counterfactual gender gaps  
                
 
  Quantile regressions (percentage of the unconditional wage distribution) 
 5th   10th   25th   50th   75th   90th   95th 
                            
Observed gender gap  0,000  0,000  0,000  -0,010  -0,018  0,002  0,074 
  (0,000)  (0,000)  (0,000)  (0,004)  (0,008)  (0,007)  (0,008) 
I. Counterfactual gap 
?̃?𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(?̂?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 − ?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)  
-0,010  -0,012  -0,010  -0,033  -0,097  -0,099  -0,107 
  (0,004)  (0,003)  (0,002)  (0,005)  (0,007)  (0,012)  (0,015) 
II. Counterfactual gap  
?̃?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(?̂?𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 − ?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)  
-0,006  -0,007  -0,010  -0,055  -0,090  -0,105  -0,116 
  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,003)  (0,005)  (0,007)  (0,010) 
Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006. 
Notes: First counterfactual density is constructed assuming that women have the characteristics of male employees and returns to 
these characteristics of female employees and the second assuming that men have the characteristics of female employees and 
returns to these characteristics of male employees using a random sample of the data consisting of 20% of the data. Standard errors 
in parenthesis are obtained by bootstrapping the results 100 times.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Counterfactual gender wage gaps within 95% confidence level 
I. Counterfactual gap 
 
II. Counterfactual gap 
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The first counterfactual gap in Table 8 shows that, even if, women were given men’s characteristics 
but had their own returns on these characteristics, there would be a pay penalty for women. 
Similarly, the second counterfactual density in Table 8 suggests that keeping their own labor 
market characteristics, if women would be rewarded like their male counterparts they would earn 
more at all the quantiles of the wage distribution. Therefore the gender gap at the top of the 
distribution is due to the differences in rewards between women and men for their labor market 
characteristics, rather than the differences in these characteristics. This is more apparent in Figure 
6, where the decomposition results for the model that controls for age, seniority, education, 
employment type, occupation and sector, as well as the firm characteristics as a function of the 
percentiles is plotted. As seen in Figure 6, the effects of coefficients are always below the observed 
gender gap while the effects of characteristics are always above. Furthermore this effect is rising 
throughout the wage distribution, with a sharp distinction as we move from the lower tail to the 
upper tail, which indicates the existence of a glass ceiling in the Turkish labor market. Despite the 
fact that the characteristics have an opposite effect, as the effects of coefficients at all points of the 
wage distribution pull down the observed gender gap, the glass ceiling effect is not apparent in the 
raw gender gap. 
 
 
Figure 6. Decomposition of the observed gender wage gap 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This study provides evidence on the integration of women into the Turkish labor market and 
contributes to the literature on the gender pay gap at different points of the wage distribution. 
Similarities and contrasts between the experience of Turkey and that of other countries covered in 
the previous literature can be highlighted.  
First of all, this study reveals the existence of a significant glass ceiling effect in the Turkish labor 
market. These results are comparable to the findings of several previous studies that consider the 
glass ceiling effect in European countries (Albrecht et al., 2003; Jellal et al. 2008). The glass 
ceiling effect in the Turkish labor market is mostly due to differences in rewards between women 
and men for their labor market characteristics, rather than to the differences in these characteristics 
at the top of the distribution, which is very much in line with the findings of previous studies. 
Secondly, and as opposed to most of the previous literature, the glass ceiling effect in Turkey is 
not apparent in the observed raw gender gap. As far as we know, this is not a common 
phenomenon. The glass ceiling effect is not observed in the raw gap and is revealed only by the 
regression and decomposition analyses due to a composition effect ― in Turkey, women 
employees are concentrated in the higher education group.  
Then again, this study is limited by the constraints of the data set. The lack of information about 
household composition of the employees that is very likely to affect women’s labor force 
participation decision, as well as their occupation and sector choice, prevents this study from 
having an additional discussion on selection issues. Therefore, the link between the results of this 
study and “the puzzle of low female labor force participation” in Turkey, and the cross-country 
lessons to understand this link are still remaining as an issue for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Pooled quantile regressions with basic control variables 
            
Variables 
  Quantile regressions (percentage of the conditional wage distribution)   OLS 
  5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th   mean 
Female  -0,000 -0,000 -0,009*** -0,024*** -0,058*** -0,077*** -0,067***  -0,051*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007)  (0,002) 
Age  -0,000 -0,000*** -0,003*** 0,004*** 0,027*** 0,060*** 0,076***  0,029*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)  (0,001) 
Age2/100  0,001* 0,001*** 0,005*** -0,003*** -0,029*** -0,061*** -0,075***  -0,030*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003)  (0,001) 
Seniority  0,005*** 0,007*** 0,023*** 0,051*** 0,061*** 0,054*** 0,048***  0,045*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001)  (0,000) 
Primary education and  
secondary school  0,006*** 0,003 0,019*** 0,024*** 0,084*** 0,123*** 0,129***  0,076*** 
  (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,005) (0,007)  (0,003) 
High school  0,011*** 0,023*** 0,040*** 0,049*** 0,222*** 0,360*** 0,426***  0,184*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003) (0,005) (0,008)  (0,002) 
Vocational high school  0,036*** 0,044*** 0,062*** 0,203*** 0,446*** 0,528*** 0,569***  0,322*** 
  (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,004) (0,005) (0,006) (0,010)  (0,003) 
Higher education  0,054*** 0,058*** 0,147*** 0,608*** 1,060*** 1,335*** 1,417***  0,712*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,003) (0,005) (0,006) (0,007) (0,009)  (0,002) 
Constant  0,925*** 0,943*** 0,983*** 0,895*** 0,534*** 0,111*** 0,034  0,411*** 
  (0,005) (0,002) (0,003) (0,004) (0,013) (0,017) (0,035)  (0,012) 
Number of observations  302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714  302 714 
Pseudo-R2   0,02 0,01 0,03 0,23 0,34 0,34 0,33   0,40 
Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006.  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For quantile regressions bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are reported.  
*, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2. Pooled quantile regressions with extended control variables 
            
Variables 
  Quantile regressions (percentage of the conditional wage distribution)   OLS 
  5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th   mean 
Female  -0,000 -0,000 -0,010*** -0,023*** -0,058*** -0,078*** -0,069***  -0,051*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,006)  (0,002) 
Age  -0,000 -0,001 -0,003*** 0,003*** 0,027*** 0,060*** 0,076***  0,029*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)  (0,001) 
Age2/100  -0,001* 0,001*** 0,005*** -0,003*** -0,029*** -0,061*** -0,075***  -0,030*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003)  (0,001) 
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Seniority  0,005*** 0,007*** 0,023*** 0,051*** 0,061*** 0,054*** 0,048***  0,045*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001)  (0,000) 
Primary education and  
secondary school  0,005*** 0,003 0,019*** 0,025*** 0,085*** 0,123*** 0,128***  0,076*** 
  (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003) (0,005) (0,008)  (0,003) 
High school  0,011*** 0,023*** 0,040*** 0,026*** 0,223*** 0,361*** 0,425***  0,184*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005) (0,008)  (0,002) 
Vocational high school  0,035*** 0,044*** 0,062*** 0,206*** 0,447*** 0,527*** 0,568***  0,322*** 
  (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,004) (0,004) (0,007) (0,011)  (0,003) 
Higher education  0,054*** 0,058*** 0,146*** 0,612*** 1,061*** 1,334*** 1,416***  0,712*** 
  (0,002) (0,000) (0,004) (0,005) (0,007) (0,007) (0,009)  (0,002) 
Fixed term employment  -0,005 -0,002* 0,020*** 0,019*** 0,007 -0,037*** -0,047***  -0,003 
  (0,004) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,005) (0,007) (0,011)  (0,004) 
Constant  0,925*** 0,944*** 0,983*** 0,898*** 0,534*** 0,114*** -0,022  0,411*** 
  (0,005) (0,002) (0,004) (0,004) (0,014) (0,019) (0,035)  (0,012) 
Number of observations  302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714  302 714 
Pseudo-R2   0,02 0,01 0,03 0,23 0,34 0,34 0,33   0,40 
Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006.  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For quantile regressions bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are reported.  
*, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively 
 
 
 
Table A.3. Pooled quantile regressions with extended control variables and sector 
            
Variables 
  Quantile regressions (percentage of the conditional wage distribution)   OLS 
  5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th   mean 
Female  -0,000 -0,001* -0,009*** -0,019*** -0,056*** -0,082*** -0,082***  -0,055*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007)  (0,002) 
Age  0,000 -0,000** -0,002*** 0,003*** 0,024*** 0,055*** 0,067***  0,027*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)  (0,001) 
Age2/100  -0,000 0,001*** 0,004*** -0,002*** -0,025*** -0,055*** -0,063***  -0,027*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003)  (0,001) 
Seniority  0,006*** 0,007*** 0,017*** 0,045*** 0,055*** 0,050*** 0,047***  0,040*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001)  (0,000) 
Primary education and  
secondary school  0,008*** 0,008*** 0,016*** 0,029*** 0,084*** 0,127*** 0,128***  0,075*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,005) (0,007)  (0,003) 
High school  0,012*** 0,021*** 0,028*** 0,055*** 0,197*** 0,327*** 0,384***  0,169*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,005) (0,007)  (0,002) 
Vocational high school  0,034*** 0,043*** 0,045*** 0,190*** 0,432*** 0,501*** 0,534***  0,302*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,004) (0,005) (0,005) (0,009)  (0,003) 
Higher education  0,056*** 0,056*** 0,103*** 0,532*** 0,995*** 1,283*** 1,369***  0,672*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,005) (0,006) (0,006) (0,009)  (0,003) 
Fixed term employment  -0,010*** -0,007*** 0,006*** -0,013*** -0,003 -0,049*** -0,059***  -0,008* 
  (0,003) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007) (0,012)  (0,004) 
Constant  0,918*** 0,946*** 1,010*** 0,948*** 0,678*** 0,342*** 0,265***  0,545*** 
  (0,007) (0,004) (0,004) (0,006) (0,016) (0,024) (0,031)  (0,013) 
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Number of observations  302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714  302 714 
Pseudo-R2   0,03 0,03 0,08 0,26 0,36 0,36 0,35   0,44 
Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006.  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For quantile regressions bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are reported.  
*, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively 
1.The regressions include 12 economic activity (NACE Rev. 1.1) dummies: 1. Mining and quarrying, 2. Manufacturing , 3. Electricity, gas 
and water supply, 4. Construction, 5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and  personal and household goods, 
6. Hotels and restaurants, 7. Transport, storage and communication, 8. Financial intermediation, 9. Real estate, renting and business 
activities, 10. Education, 11. Health and social work, 12. Other community, social and personal service activities 
 
 
 
Table A.4. Pooled quantile regressions with extended control variables, sector and occupation 
            
Variables 
  Quantile regressions (percentage of the conditional wage distribution)   OLS 
  5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th   mean 
Female  -0,000 -0,002*** -0,010*** -0,023*** -0,058*** -0,095*** -0,096***  -0,055*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007)  (0,002) 
Age  0,000 -0,000 -0,003*** 0,003*** 0,023*** 0,052*** 0,061***  0,025*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)  (0,001) 
Age2/100  -0,000 0,001*** 0,004*** -0,002*** -0,026*** -0,056*** -0,062***  -0,027*** 
  (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003)  (0,001) 
Seniority  0,006*** 0,007*** 0,017*** 0,044*** 0,054*** 0,050*** 0,047***  0,039*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001)  (0,000) 
Primary education and  
secondary school  0,007*** 0,008*** 0,016*** 0,027*** 0,072*** 0,100*** 0,093***  0,063*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,005) (0,007)  (0,003) 
High school  0,012*** 0,018*** 0,025*** 0,046*** 0,153*** 0,237*** 0,262***  0,128*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,005) (0,007)  (0,002) 
Vocational high school  0,033*** 0,041*** 0,042*** 0,175*** 0,377*** 0,404*** 0,408***  0,256*** 
  (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,005) (0,005) (0,006) (0,008)  (0,003) 
Higher education  0,053*** 0,052*** 0,092*** 0,452*** 0,764*** 0,944*** 1,006***  0,532*** 
  (0,002) (0,001) (0,004) (0,006) (0,006) (0,010) (0,012)  (0,003) 
Fixed term employment  -0,009*** -0,006*** 0,007*** 0,016*** 0,007* -0,033*** -0,051***  0,006 
  (0,003) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007) (0,009)  (0,004) 
Constant  0,924*** 0,954*** 1,078*** 1,282*** 1,341*** 1,169*** 1,239***  0,963*** 
  (0,007) (0,003) (0,007) (0,012) (0,018) (0,029) (0,039)  (0,013) 
Number of observations  302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714 302 714  302 714 
Pseudo-R2   0,03 0,03 0,08 0,27 0,38 0,38 0,38   0,45 
Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006.  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For quantile regressions bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are reported.  
*, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively 
1.The regressions include 8 major occupation group (ISCO, 88) dummies: 1. Legislators, senior officials and managers, 2. Professionals, 
3. Technicians and associate professionals, 4. Clerks, 5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers, 6.Craft and related trade 
workers, 7. Plant and machine operators and assemblers, 8. Elementary occupations 
2.The regressions include 12 economic activity (NACE Rev. 1.1) dummies: 1. Mining and quarrying, 2. Manufacturing , 3. Electricity, gas 
and water supply, 4. Construction, 5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and  personal and household goods, 
6. Hotels and restaurants, 7. Transport, storage and communication, 8. Financial intermediation, 9. Real estate, renting and business 
activities, 10. Education, 11. Health and social work, 12. Other community, social and personal service activities 
 
